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Turkey’s	missing	swing	voters:	Understanding	the
results	of	the	2018	Turkish	elections
Turkish	President	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan	secured	victory	in	legislative	and	presidential
elections	on	24	June.	The	vote	ensured	that	Erdogan	can	now	govern	the	country	using
new	executive	powers	which	were	approved	in	a	referendum	in	2017.	Sevinç	Bermek	and
Ledün	Çevik	write	that	although	there	were	no	radical	shifts	in	support	from	the	last
legislative	elections	in	2015,	it	is	difficult	to	predict	where	Turkish	politics	will	go	from	here
given	the	changes	that	have	been	made	to	the	country’s	political	system.
Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan,	Credit:	NATO	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
On	24	June,	Turkey	held	both	legislative	and	presidential	elections.	Though	the	elections	were	supposed	to	take
place	next	year,	a	snap	election	was	called	after	Erdogan’s	meeting	with	his	ultranationalist	ally	Devlet	Bahceli,	who
is	the	leader	of	the	Milliyetci	Hareket	Partisi	(Nationalist	Movement	Party	–	MHP).
It	is	important	to	remember	that	Turkey	had	held	a	referendum	for	a	shift	from	parliamentary	democracy	toward	an
executive	presidency	in	April	2017.	The	new	system	was	accepted	by	a	narrow	margin	(51.4	per	cent	voting	in
favour).	Since	the	failed	coup	in	July	2016,	the	country	has	been	de	facto	ruled	by	the	presidential	system	due	to	the
state	of	emergency	status.	This	has	provided	excessive	power	to	Erdogan	to	govern	the	country	with	decrees	and
has	supressed	legislative	authority.	In	line	with	this	already	unusual	political	background,	the	2018	elections
legitimised	this	ruling	system.
The	presidential	elections
For	the	presidential	elections,	there	were	six	candidates;	the	main	rivalry	occurred	among	Erdogan,	Muharrem	İnce,
Meral	Aksener,	and	Selahattin	Demirtas.	Erdogan’s	Adalet	ve	Kalkinma	Partisi	(Justice	and	Development	Party	–
AKP)	established	a	‘People’s	Alliance’	with	Bahceli’s	MHP	for	both	the	presidential	and	legislative	elections	and
aimed	to	target	conservative-nationalist	constituencies.
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During	the	electoral	campaign,	Erdogan	promised	reinforcement	of	the	economy	(especially	with	regard	to	interest
rates	and	inflation)	as	well	as	further	integration	into	the	global	economic	market.	Erdogan	received	52	per	cent	of
the	votes	and	was	thereby	re-elected	for	the	second	time	as	president	(as	shown	in	Figure	1).	The	results	illustrate
the	conservative,	nationalist	and	intermediary	strata’s	allegiance	to	Erdogan	–	albeit	a	weaker	allegiance	than	a
decade	ago	–	and	their	support	for	his	proposals	on	political	stability.	Regarding	political	stability,	the	public’s
concerns	over	national	security	and	the	rise	of	terrorism	played	a	strong	role	in	Erdogan’s	re-election	as	president.
The	results	also	highlighted	approval	for	the	economic	policies	pursued	by	his	administration	over	the	last	couple	of
years	which	have	fuelled	consumption	(and	borrowing)	led-growth	that	primarily	benefited	his	core	constituents.
Figure	1:	Results	of	the	June	2018	Turkish	presidential	election
Note:	Figures	compiled	by	Aslı	Ünan.
In	addition,	his	alliance	with	the	ultranationalist	bloc	significantly	helped	his	campaign	for	the	presidency	since	the
MHP	did	not	nominate	a	candidate	from	its	cadres	and	instead	supported	Erdogan’s	candidacy	for	its	second	tenure.
Among	the	candidates,	Erdogan’s	main	challenger	was	Ince	who	got	30.6	per	cent	of	the	votes.	Even	though	Ince
lost	his	chance	for	the	presidency,	he	managed	to	unite	the	oppositional	bloc	(including	Kurdish	voters)	along	the
axes	of	secularism,	parliamentary	democracy	and	justice.	His	campaign	attracted	millions	of	people,	especially	in
three	metropolitan	cities	due	to	his	inclusive	approach.	The	lack	of	a	sound	economic	reform	package	and	the	fact	he
did	not	go	beyond	his	critique	of	Erdogan	damaged	his	chances.	Nevertheless,	due	to	his	increasing	popularity,	he
may	play	a	crucial	role	in	the	internal	party	politics	of	the	Cumhuriyet	Halk	Partisi	(Republican	People’s	Party	–	CHP)
in	the	near	future.
Demirtas,	of	the	Halklarin	Demokratik	Partisi	(People’s	Democratic	Party	–	HDP),	ran	his	campaign	from	prison
following	his	arrest	on	terrorism	charges.	Despite	the	obstacles	this	posed	for	conducting	a	political	campaign,	he	still
received	8.4	per	cent	of	the	vote	and	became	the	third	most	popular	candidate.	Lastly,	Aksener,	who	got	7.3	per	cent
of	the	vote,	has	become	a	critical	actor	due	to	his	ability	to	secure	both	nationalist	and	secular	votes.
Legislative	elections
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Overall,	the	presidential	elections	highlighted	that	the	Turkish	electorate	has	continued	to	prioritise	‘stability	under
strong	leadership’,	but	the	legislative	election	results	sent	a	different	set	of	signals.	Similar	to	the	presidential
elections,	the	parties	established	alliances	for	the	legislative	contest:	the	AKP	and	MHP’s	People’s	Alliance;	while	the
CHP,	the	İyi	Party	(Good	Party	–	IP)	and	the	Saadet	Partisi	(Felicity	Party	–	SP)	established	the	Nation’s	Alliance
(Millet	Ittifaki).	The	left-leaning	pro-Kurdish	HDP	did	not	join	either	of	these	alliances.
The	legislative	elections	highlighted	that	Turkish	voters	remain	in	two	core	blocs,	and	there	has	been	a	minor	shift	of
votes	from	one	bloc	to	the	other.	The	Turkish	electoral	system	requires	a	party	to	obtain	at	least	10	per	cent	of	the
national	vote	to	have	seats	in	parliament.	Much	as	was	the	case	in	the	presidential	election,	Erdogan’s	victory	was
secured	via	the	ultranationalist	vote,	but	the	MHP	also	managed	to	pass	the	electoral	threshold	(11.1	per	cent,	49
seats)	by	securing	the	nationalist	and	Islamist	votes	of	the	AKP.	In	the	meantime,	the	AKP	remained	the	leading
party	with	42.5	per	cent	(295	seats).
Similar	to	the	vote	trading	that	took	place	among	the	conservative-nationalist	bloc,	the	CHP’s	urban	and	left-oriented
constituency	voted	for	the	HDP	to	help	them	pass	the	threshold	(with	11.7	per	cent,	67	seats),	something	that	had
previously	occurred	in	the	two	legislative	elections	held	in	2015.	The	CHP	remained	the	main	opposition	party	with
22.6	per	cent	(146	seats).	Figure	2	shows	how	the	electoral	picture	looked	after	the	legislative	election	in	June	2015,
while	Figure	3	shows	how	this	picture	has	changed	(or	rather,	not	changed)	following	the	2018	legislative	election.
Figure	2:	Results	of	the	June	2015	Turkish	legislative	election
Source:	Supreme	Electoral	Council	of	Turkey;	compiled	by	Aslı	Ünan.
Figure	3:	Results	of	the	2018	Turkish	legislative	election
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Source:	Supreme	Electoral	Council	of	Turkey;	compiled	by	Aslı	Ünan.
Meanwhile,	the	IP,	which	was	established	as	a	centre-right	alternative	for	the	conservative	Turkish	electorate,
managed	to	secure	65	seats	by	capturing	the	support	of	CHP,	MHP	and	AKP	voters.	Overall,	in	terms	of	the	political
cleavages	that	exist	in	Turkish	politics,	there	were	no	significant	transfers	of	votes	across	the	two	blocs	and	the
electorate	remains	highly	polarised.	As	socio-economic,	ethnic	and	ideological	cleavages	become	more	entrenched,
it	can	be	expected	that	voters	will	be	less	likely	to	move	away	from	their	political	allegiances.
The	main	outcome	from	the	election	is	that	Erdogan	has	now	overshadowed	his	party,	securing	his	role	as	President
of	the	country.	But	without	the	AKP’s	alliance	with	the	ultranationalist	bloc,	it	is	questionable	whether	such	power
over	the	legislature	would	have	been	possible.	As	it	stands,	the	MHP	–	depending	on	the	legislative	amendments	put
forward	by	other	opposition	parties	–	may	check	and	balance	the	AKP’s	parliamentary	power.
The	voting	distribution	across	parties	has	not	radically	changed	since	June	2015,	but	the	new	presidential	system	will
restructure	legislative	procedures	and	the	role	of	the	presidency.	Prior	to	the	elections,	the	main	concern	was	with
lifting	the	state	of	emergency.	However,	now	that	the	state	of	emergency	has	been	lifted,	the	new	political	system
granting	Erdogan	extensive	powers	will	be	no	more	progressive	than	the	state	of	emergency	status	was.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	The	charts	in	this	article	were	kindly	compiled	by	Aslı	Ünan,	a	PhD	Candidate	in	Political	Economy	at	King’s
College	London.The	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy
or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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